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Security of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol based on noisy coherent states and chan-
nel is analyzed. Assuming the noise of coherent states is induced by Fred, a neutral party relative to others,
we prove that the prepare and measurement scheme and entanglement-based scheme are equivalent. Then, we
show that this protocol is secure against Gaussian collective attacks even if the channel is lossy and noisy, and
further, a lower bound to the secure key rate is derived.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
The principles of quantum mechanics make it possible to
distribute physically secure keys between two distant parties
[1, 2]. In particular, continuous-variable quantum key distri-
bution (CV-QKD) has made remarkable achievements during
the past few years. Several CV-QKD schemes based on co-
herent states combined with homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion have been proposed [3, 4] and experimentally demon-
strated [5]–[8], and the unconditional security of CV-QKD
with ideal optical source has also been systematically stud-
ied [9, 10, 11, 12]. However, there still have difficulties to
calculate the secure key rate of the CV-QKD protocols with
noisy coherent states, because of the absence of a good model
to characterize the source imperfections. For instance, it is not
a good idea to ascribe the source imperfection to the channel
excess noise directly, which implies that Eve is able to control
such noise. In this case, Eve actually knows that Alice is using
a P&M scheme instead of an E-B one, and the two schemes
are no longer equivalent. Further more, from a practical view-
point, it is suspicious to assume that Eve is able to control
the noise inside Alice’s side. The same topic was discussed
recently [13], in which the noise of source and modulation
is controlled neither by legitimate users nor eavesdroppers.
However, under this assumption, Eve can not purify the states
of Alice and Bob, which implies that the previous proof on
the optimality of Gaussian attacks [14] is not available. As
a result, the key rate derived in [13] may be insecure under
collective attack.
To solve these problems, in this paper, we propose a new
way to characterize the source and modulation noise and de-
rive a security bound of the CV-QKD protocol through a lossy
and noisy channel. As we know, in a standard prepare and
measurement (P&M) scheme, Alice generates two Gaussian
random numbers, QA and PA, with mean values 0 and vari-
ances VA, to prepare |QA + iPA〉 by modulating an initial co-
herent state. Then, she sends this state to Bob through a
quantum channel characterized by transmittance T and ex-
cess noise εC . Receiving the state, Bob randomly chooses one
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FIG. 1: (color online) The P&M scheme. A random number gen-
erator (RNG) gives two values QA and PA. The coherent state is
generated in source (Src) with shot noise (δQA, δPA), and then, its
central position in phase space is displaced by Gaussian modulations
with (QA + ∆QA, PA + ∆PA). The noise ∆QA and ∆PA is assumed to
be individually induced by a neutral party, Fred.
quadrature to measure and informs Alice which observable he
measured. Then, Alice and Bob should share two correlated
Gaussian variables, from which they can extract a private bi-
nary key with standard reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion process. However, in a realistic case, the optical source
and modulators are imperfect and inevitably induces extra ex-
cess noise (denoted by two Gaussian random numbers ∆QA
and ∆PA) to the coherent state. As a result, Alice actually pre-
pares a state of |(QA + ∆QA) + i(PA + ∆PA)〉, where ∆QA and
∆PA, independent with QA and PA, have mean values 0 and
variances ε0 [13]. In a trusted-source model, neither Eve nor
Alice can control this excess noise. So, it is convenient to phe-
nomenologically assume that the noise of coherent state is not
induced by the imperfection of devices but by a neutral party,
Fred, who generates two random numbers, ∆QA and ∆PA, and
then introduces corresponding extra noise to the coherent state
after an ideal modulation (See Fig. 1). In this case, the state
sent to Bob is denoted by quadratures (Q,P), which satisfy
Q = QA + δQA + ∆QA,
P = PA + δPA + ∆PA,
(1)
where δQA and δPA are originated from shot noise, and satisfy〈
δQ2A
〉
=
〈
δP2A
〉
= 1, in shot-noise units. The conditional
2FIG. 2: (color online) The E–B scheme. Fred prepares ρAB for Alice.
In order to prepare a coherent state for Bob, Alice can measure both
quadrature of her beam with a balanced heterodyne detector.
variance VQ|QA is [15]
VQ|QA =
〈
Q2
〉
− 〈QQA〉
2〈
Q2A
〉 = (1 + ε0). (2)
For the convenience of theoretical analysis, here we pro-
pose an entanglement based (E-B) scheme and will show it is
equivalent to the P&M scheme. As shown in Fig. 2, Fred pre-
pares a pair of EPR beams ρAB, and holds its purification. The
global pure state shared by Alice, Bob and Fred is denoted by
|ψABF〉, and ρAB is assumed to be a Gaussian state. Quadra-
tures (Q, P) denote the state sent to Bob, and (Q′, P′) denote
the state kept by Alice. Here, we assume (Q, P) and (Q′, P′)
satisfy 〈
Q2
〉
=
〈
P2
〉
= (V + ε0),
〈
Q′2
〉
=
〈
P′2
〉
= V, (3)
where V = VA + 1. According to [15], we obtain
| 〈QQ′〉 |2 ≤ 〈Q2〉 〈Q′2〉 −
〈
Q′2
〉
〈
P2
〉 = (V + ε0)V − VV + ε0 . (4)
We assume that 〈QQ′〉 = √V2 − 1, (5)
which absolutely satisfies Eq. (4). Similarly, we assume that〈
PP′
〉
= −
√
V2 − 1. (6)
In E-B scheme, Alice makes a balanced heterodyne detection
on Q′ and P′ simultaneously. Denoting the values of Q′ and
P′ measurements as Q′A and P′A, we have [15]
Q′ = Q′A + δQ′A, P′ = P′A + δP′A, (7)
where
〈
δQ′A2
〉
=
〈
δP′A
2
〉
= 1. Alice’s best estimate of (Q, P)
is denoted by (QA, PA), which satisfy [15]
QA =
√
V − 1
V + 1 Q
′
A, PA = −
√
V − 1
V + 1 P
′
A. (8)
We can easily get〈
Q2A
〉
=
〈
P2A
〉
= (V − 1) = VA,
VQ|QA = VP|PA = (1 + ε0),
(9)
which shows the same result as in P&M scheme. Let us sup-
pose the EPR source and the measuring apparatus of Alice are
hidden in a black box. The only outputs of this black box are
the values of ε0, QA and PA, and the beam (Q, P). For Eve, this
black box is indistinguishable from the equivalent black box,
sketched in the P&M scheme. So, we can calculate the se-
cure key rate in the E-B scheme. When Eve makes collective
attacks, she interacts individually with each quantum state in
the same way. Accordingly, the global state |ψABF〉 becomes
|ψABEF 〉. After Alice and Bob’s measurements, Alice, Bob and
Eve should share correlated Classical-Classical-Quantum in-
formation (CCQ correlations) [16], and the security key rate
can be calculated by [17]
KD = I(a : b) − χ(a : E),
KR = I(a : b) − χ(b : E), (10)
where KD and KR correspond to the direct and reverse rec-
onciliation, respectively. I(a : b) is the Shannon mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob. χ(a : E) = S (ρE) −∫
P(a)S (ρaE)da and χ(b : E) = S (ρE) −
∫
P(b)S (ρbE)db are
Holevo bounds [18], which put an upper limit on how much
information can be contained in a quantum system. S (ρE) is
the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state ρE , and S (ρaE) [S (ρbE)]
is the von Neumann conditional entropy of ρE while knowing
the measurement value a (b) of Alice (Bob). However, since
ρABE is not a pure state, and the optimality of Gaussian attacks
has not been proved, we can not calculate a minimum KD or
KR directly. Fortunately, if we suppose the state of Fred can be
controlled by Eve, and |ψABEF 〉 is a pure state, we can derive a
lower bound of KD or KR, denoted by ˜KD and ˜KR, where
˜KD = I(a : b) − χ(a : EF),
˜KR = I(b : a) − χ(b : EF), (11)
where χ(a : EF) and χ(b : EF) are the Holevo bounds be-
tween Alice and the eavesdroppers. It can be proved that [19]
χ(a : EF) − χ(a : E) ≥ 0. (12)
Since ρABEF is a pure state, it has been proved that ˜KD and
˜KR get their minimal values when ρAB is a Gaussian state
[14]. The Shannon mutual information is given by I(a : b) =
1/2 log2(Vb
/
Vb|a), where Vb is the variance of the random vari-
able of Bob, and Vb|a is the conditional variance of the random
variable of Bob while knowing Alice’s measurement. Here,
we can only calculate the case of Q quadrature for the sym-
metry in Q and P. Let QB′ be the result of Bob’s measurement
on the Q quadrature and QA be Alice’s best estimate of QB′ .
We obtain
Vb =
〈
Q2B′
〉
= T (V + χ),
Vb|a =
〈
Q2B′
〉
− 〈QAQB′〉
2〈
Q2A
〉 = T (1 + χ), (13)
where χ = (1 − T )/T +ε0+εc, and εc denotes the excess noise
in the channel. Hence
I(a : b) = 1
2
log2
(
V + χ
1 + χ
)
. (14)
3Since ρABEF is pure, we have S (ρEF )=S (ρAB). So,
χ(a : EF) = S (ρEF ) −
∫
P(a)S (ρaEF)da
= S (ρAB) −
∫
P(a)S (ρaAB)da.
(15)
For a two-mode Gaussian state ρAB, we can calculate its von
Neumann entropy with its covariance matrix γAB [20], which
can be expressed as
γAB =
[
A C
CT B
]
, (16)
where A, B and C are 2 × 2 blocks. Let ∆(γAB) = det A +
det B + 2 det C, and
s1,2 =
√
∆(γAB) ±
√
∆2(γAB) − 4 det(γAB)
2
. (17)
Then the von Neumann entropy of ρAB is [20]
S (ρAB) = g(s1) + g(s2), (18)
where
g(x) = x + 1
2
log2
(
x + 1
2
)
− x − 1
2
log2
(
x − 1
2
)
. (19)
In the case where Alice prepares coherent states and Bob
makes homodyne detection, it is easy to see that the covari-
ance matrix of ρAB is
γAB =
[
xI zσ
zσ yI
]
, (20)
where x = V , y = T (V + χ), z =
√
T (V2 − 1), I = diag(1, 1)
and σ = diag(1,−1). So
det(γAB) = (T + TχV)2,
∆(γAB) = V2 − 2T (V2 − 1) + (TV + Tχ)2. (21)
When Alice makes her measurement, she splits her mode into
two beams by a 50:50 beam splitter, and measures the Q and
P quadratures of two beams respectively. If Bob chooses a
quadrature to measure, say, the Q quadrature, then Alice dis-
cards the result of the measurement on the P quadrature. It
is easy to see that the two mode state ρaAB is still a Gaussian
state. The covariance matrix of this state is
γaAB =

2V
V + 1
0
√
2T (V − 1)
V + 1
0
0 V + 1
2
0 −
√
T (V2 − 1)
2√
2T (V − 1)
V + 1
0 T (1 + χ) 0
0 −
√
T (V2 − 1)
2
0 T (V + χ)

, (22)
and
det(γaAB) = (T + Tχ)(T + TχV),
∆(γaAB) = 2T + T 2χ(1 + χ) +
[
T 2χ + (1 − T )2
]
V. (23)
It can be found that the von Neumann conditional entropy
S (ρaAB) does not depend on Alice’s measurement a. So the
Holevo bound is simply equal to
χ(a : EF) = S (ρAB) − S (ρaAB). (24)
At the high modulation limit (V ≫ 1/(1 − T ), 1/T ), the lower
bound of the secure key rate for the direct reconciliation is
˜KhomD =
1
2
log2
[
T 2χ + (1 − T )2
1 + χ
]
− log2(1 − T )
−g
( Tχ
1 − T
)
+ g

√(1 + χ)χT√
T 2χ + (1 − T )2
 .
(25)
Similarly, we can derive ˜KhomR in the high modulation limit,
˜KhomR =
1
2
log2
(
χ
1 + χ
)
− log2(1 − T ) − g
( Tχ
1 − T
)
. (26)
The limiting value of ε0 is shown as
ε0 =
1
2

√
1 + 16
e2
− 1
 ≈ 0.39. (27)
4FIG. 3: (color online) The lower bound and the secure key rate as
a function of the transmittance of the channel; solid line– ˜KhomR , dash
line–KhomR .
We will give a demonstration on how much the security bound
is lower than the key rate derived in [13]. For comparing with
the result in [13], we just consider the effect of the noisy co-
herent states, and any excess noise in the channel is now as-
sumed to be negligible. When the channel is noiseless, the
key rate derived in [13] is
KhomR = −
1
2
log2
[(
T
V + ε0
+ 1 − T
)
T (1 + χ)
]
, (28)
and in the high modulation limit it becomes
KhomR =
1
2
log2
[
1
T (1 − T )(1 + χ)
]
. (29)
There is no limiting value of ε0 in this case. If ε0 = 0, ˜KhomR
and KhomR are the same, otherwise ˜KhomR is obviously smaller
than KhomR , as shown in Fig. 3. The exact secure key rate is just
between the solid line and the dash line. So we can estimate
how much information is lost when we use the lower bound.
However, if the noise of the source is too large, the security
bound will be too low and the gap between the solid line and
dash line will be too large. In this case, it is hard to estimate
how much information we lose. This problem can be solved
if we can effectively purify the coherent state and reduce the
excess noise [13].
In conclusion, we study the security of a continuous-
variable quantum key distribution protocol with noisy coher-
ent states sent through a lossy and noisy channel. Though the
protocol discussed is a P&M scheme, it is proved to be equiv-
alent to an E-B scheme when we assume the noise in coherent
states is induced by Fred, a neutral party, who does not give
Eve any information. Though the state shared by Alice, Bob
and Eve is not a pure state, and the secure key rate can not be
calculated directly, we can derive the maximal mutual infor-
mation between Eve and Alice/ Bob, if she is able to acquire
extra information from Fred. So, we actually derive a lower
bound to the secure key rate. We also give a demonstration
that when the channel is lossy but noiseless, the lower bound
becomes lower than the key rate derived in [13] with the in-
crease of the excess noise in the coherent states. We can also
purify the noisy coherent states to get a better estimation on
the information lost.
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